What Money Can't Buy读后感10篇
《What Money Can't Buy》是一本由Michael J. Sandel著作，Farrar, Straus and Giroux出版的Hardcover图书，本书定价：USD 27.00，页数：256，特精心从网络上整理的一些读者的读后感，希望对大家能有帮助。
《What Money Can't Buy》读后感(一)：公平和道义，如何是好。
这本书讲的是市场扩张到了原本不该进入的领域，以至于很多具体或抽象的东西都可以用钱买到。于是作者从不同的角度分析了这种现象的深层意义。
作者对于这种现象基本是持否定的态度。原因在于两点：一是违背了公平原则，一是违背了道义。作者叹息人心不古的同时也表达了忧虑。如果有一天人们对此习以为常，那才是最可怕的。
人们过分贪婪的逐利，是原因之一。另一个原因则是可用资源有限。对于违背公平的原则，政府可以介入干预。但是对于第二种情况，即两方都收益，而损害的仅仅是道义，则无能为力了。
作者有时候会哀叹人心不古。在市场经济面前，传统毫无招架之力。
市场和道德有没有联系？很多经济学家认为两者并无联系。但实质上会互相影响。 用钱来刺激是否有必要和好的结果也值得商榷。
书中举了很多有趣的例子。如果作者的语言能够再干练点，少绕圈子就更好了。
《What Money Can't Buy》读后感(二)：What Money Can Buy
Instead of talking about what money can’t buy, most paragraphs explain what money can buy. Most people, myself being one of them, expecting something warm and ethical, are frustrated to learn the bloodycruel truth again.
What money can buy？ Almost everything.
What money can’t buy？ Merely nothing.
Actually, as long as the market asks for, there would emerge supply for customer’s needs. That’s the market triumphalism. You can’t buy Nobel Prize but you can buy word-famous university diplomas; you can’t buy friendship and love but you can buy gifts to show your sincerity, you can’t buy children but you can buy the right to give birth to another one. Dozens of bloody truth tell us that everything is for sale and has a price tag. Money is the mighty.
I know exactly that the author want to express the moral limits of markets and this is a society lack of moral and spiritual substance. Money should not be used to buy something related to family life, friendship, sex, health, education, nature, art, citizenship, etc. Because this is immoral and make people feel unjust. I bet lot people suffer from the unjust. If you don’t want to experience inequity again and again, what you could do？ Waiting for the money-driven and materialism world to wake up？ Or counting on the public to form conscience？ Hah. Count on yourself and don’t give yourself an easy life. That’s what makes this no-limit life easier.
《What Money Can't Buy》读后感(三)：They don't only change what we do, they change who we are.
今天早上看到一篇关于桑德尔的文章，瞬间又戳中了最近思考的东东。(《钱不该买什么》http://site.douban.com/widget/notes/10060932/note/243797347/ 随后立马把他的新书塞进Kindle看了会，mobi格式这里有：http://ishare.iask.sina.com.cn/f/34233689.html)
讨论之前先假设两个情景：
1.假如你是一名夜间值班的医生，突然来了两个需要立即手术的危重病人，年龄相近，但你只有能力救一个。
一个病人是一个流浪汉，很可能救回来也没有钱付医药费；另一个是家人开着跑车送来的，一看就非富即贵。
你选择救哪个？——好像也没啥好犹豫的。
2.那假如，同样是这两个病人，但快死的流浪汉先到10分钟，已经准备推进手术室了。这时，生命垂危的富豪病人来了，家人立刻拦下你，让你救富豪病人。
你说不行，要救先来的，家属立刻说求求你了，我拿100万谢谢你。
你愣了一下，回过神来想拒绝家属，转身回手术室时，家属立即改口增加到一千万。
事情让你很苦恼。
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今天早上还有一件小事，我下楼买支红笔，顺便吃个肠粉当早餐。
在早餐店里碰见一个阿姨，这个阿姨最近一直在拜托我娘做一件挺麻烦的事。
我打了声招呼，她很热情地要请我吃早餐，我当然说不用（话说现在的肠粉真的贵了好多，料又少了好多！！）。
吃完后她还是执意要付。我一向不喜欢那种抢着付钱的场景，所以便由得她了，同时说了声谢谢。
但回到家后一直觉得很不对劲。
我清楚记得我说“谢谢”时一点谢意都没有；
我清楚记得当时心里想的是，你麻烦了我娘那么多，请一整年早餐都算不得什么；
我清楚记得那时还立马想起《影响力》、《优势谈判》里面的营销心理——要时刻小心，不要因为最初对方一点小小的恩惠，最后不知不觉、不得不答应对方一个更大的要求。
于是我抓狂了………………………………
我很清楚记得在性格测试中，有一道题经常碰见——你倾向于认为生活中碰到的人是：1.友善的 2.别有用心的
我每次都坚定地选1.友善的； 但事实上如今我都变成什么扭曲心理了。
不知不觉就变成了一个糟糕的人，一个以前最不喜欢，对生活丝毫不感恩的人。
也许这位阿姨请我吃早餐确实是出于别有所求，但这不应当妨碍我在受到礼遇时，真诚地说句“谢谢”。
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回到最初的两个情景。
1.即便最后选择的是救有钱人，你是真的出于毫不犹豫的权衡，还是会责怪自己的无能，无力挽回另一条生命？
2.1 也许你选择了坚持救流浪汉——第二天流浪汉苏醒，表示无力偿还几万元的医药费，根据各种规定，这笔钱很可能要你来埋单，同时，富豪病人因救治不及时，死了，家属在医院门口摆灵堂，拉横幅拉媒体，说这医生见死不救，院方承受很大压力，最后你可能被炒掉了，然后回家路上被一群不明人士暴打一顿。人人说你傻。
2.2 也许你改变主意，去救富豪病人，很幸运，保住了富豪的命，家属立刻表示要“感谢”你，你再次很坚决地拒绝了。这时，有热心群众向媒体爆料，说有流浪汉病人因此无辜去世，医生选择了救有钱人。人人说你没节操没下限。你很无辜，你说你没收钱，没人相信——没收你干嘛改变主意去救那个有钱人！！院方承受了很大压力，最后你可能被炒掉了。亲友都说你蠢。
在如今这个经济越来越发达，市场经济主导的社会，我们已经很难找到一样东西是金钱所无法衡量的了，金钱的边界扩张到方方面面。
用一句我很喜欢的话便是，They don’t only change what we do, they change who we are.
（via TED http://app.hujiang.com/listen/56318/）
越是是阅读心理学、哲学之类的书（我不怎么读经济，但我一直觉得经济即是人的行为与心理的综合，归根究底，不是数学公式，只是人本身），越是去对照日常生活，越是能够发现金钱思维的侵蚀——物质交换成为社会基石，一分付出必需至少要有一分回报，否则坚决不干。
你可能一如既往地选择坚持心中的道德感，自己的inner peace，但朋友不一定会认同你，亲人不一定会认同你——别人有房有车，你没有会被人笑的；你30岁了还不结婚，我们老两口回老家很没面子的好么！；那个人很好啊！公务员！有房有车本地人！父母也是稳定单位退休的，收入有保证，也不用你负担，还犹豫什么！！
做自己并不容易，更确切说，十分困难。 你一意孤行，身边却有万千亲友三姑六婆让你别那么傻。
但有些东西，一旦开始就再也回不了头的了：比如决心做一个更善良、温暖、智慧的成熟的人。
而且，还有这些力量在背后煽风点火：）
比如乔帮主的：
If today were the last day of my life, would I want to do what I am about to do today？
Remembering that I’ll be dead soon is the most important tool I’ve ever encountered to help me make the big choices in life. Because almost everything , all external expectations, all pride, all fear of embarrassment or failure - these things just fall away in the face of death, leaving only what is truly important. Remembering that you are going to die is the best way I know to avoid the trap of thinking you have something to lose. You are already naked. There is no reason not to follow your heart.
少不了的还有博客的标题 ，来自John Denver
Today is the first day
Of the rest of my life.
I wake as a child
To see the world begin.
在成长的路上时刻准备“赴死”，所以一秒钟也不能活在别人的“经验”中。
《What Money Can't Buy》读后感(四)：【经观书评】金钱无用？
y姜灵
1998年11月，在牛津大学布拉斯诺兹学院举行的“坦纳人类价值讲座”中，哈佛大学教授迈克尔·桑德尔(MichaelJ.Sandel)向听众抛出一个疑问：“是否有金钱无法购买的东西？”
彼时，美国各个领域正在经历市场进程，并为社会积累起巨大财富。私人（私营）监狱的兴起，政府和大学的商业化，一切都在展示着“市场化”这一重要且强大的社会政治发展趋势所带来的改变。市场以及以市场为导向的思维方式已逐渐延伸至从未触及的社会生活领域。于是，对上述问题，桑德尔作答说：“很遗憾，金钱所不能买到的东西越来越少”，并进一步指出，“总的来说这种市场化发展趋势并非有益，必须加以遏制”。
在十几年后的今天，美国俨然是一个高度商业化、市场化的社会，桑德尔所提及的市场化趋势不仅没有减退，反有愈演愈烈之势。越来越多国家卷入市场的浪潮之中。
桑德尔在新书《金钱无用之地：市场的道德限度》(WhatMoneyCan’tBuy:TheMoralLimitsofMarkets)中不禁再次警惕世人：“虽然人们理所当然认为市场规范并不适用于诸如家庭生活、友谊、健康、教育、自然、艺术、体育等各方面，但事实是，市场早已侵入这些社会领域……我们已经从市场化经济进入市场化社会。”
花钱买排队优先权，教科书上印上商业赞助标识，学校用金钱鼓励学生取得好成绩，药厂利用金钱促成人体试验，器官买卖，用买血取代捐血……桑德尔列举的生动案例旨在引起我们对市场的重新思考：一切是否都能用金钱来衡量？市场的道德界限在何处？
桑德尔并不否认市场作为组织生产、制造繁荣的工具这一重要作用，但他明确指出，市场并非生活全部。正义、公正、平等、社区感以及人与人之间的相互责任感等等，这些我们历来所珍视的“非市场价值”正在被“市场价值”逐渐排挤替代。曾被我们认为神圣不可侵犯、金钱无法购买的东西，正遭受市场的侵蚀，甚至连人的“生”与“死”也无法逃脱厄运。
正如书中举例道，美国大学的布告栏中常贴有招引人们捐献精子卵子的小广告，并对那些GPA成绩高，或是犹太后裔的捐献者们予以更高酬金；一些精子银行会在假期进行优惠打折活动以吸引顾客，促进销售量。“生命之源”被肆无忌惮地进行兜售。而美国的一些寿险保单贴现公司每年能从垂死者那里获取稳定收益；高盛及其他机构甚至发行“死亡债券”，将“寿命”视为投资产品，以寿险债券的形式，转“保障”为“投机”。
面对这样的社会，桑德尔认为，其市场化体现在两方面：“非价值判断”和“效率”。比如，每当涉及对公共设施服务（如图书馆、公共电台）进行的资助问题时，“无判断主义”(nonjudgmentalism)势必抬头——人们对于“价值”的判断意见不一，无人能以权威姿态指出他所理解的“公共利益”究竟指的什么。由于缺乏一个权威基础，政府无法向人们开征税收，并将资金投入这些公共服务当中。于是，所有物品/服务都被置于自由竞争环境，服从于市场规则之下：如果这些公共服务提供者，通过向消费者提供图书馆服务和广播节目，并从中获得盈利，就说明这些服务是人们真正需要的。反之，这些所谓公共服务提供者，只是简单说教而已，假装他们比大众本身还了解什么是对他们有益的。正是这种对具有公共属性的服务或物品的价值的“无判断”，破坏了它们原有的“公众利益”本质，为它们贴上价格标签。非市场价值逐渐被市场价值排挤在外。
而有关效率的问题，则更为我们所熟悉。将市场规律奉作信条的人们认为，市场机制的分配最有效率，充分竞争的市场可以导致生产效率最优、社会福利最大。但桑德尔在书中列举以色列一所学校作为事例反驳：该学校常发生家长没有按时接送子女的情况，老师不得不延时加班，因此学校对这些家长实行罚款措施。按照市场规律，由于代价上升，家长迟到的情况应该有所减少。但是实际情况并非如此。罚款之后，家长迟到的情况更加严重。原本家长因为迟到所产生的不安和内疚，现在因为罚款，变成理所应当。学校反而成为服务方，必须为迟到的家长们延长照顾孩子的时间。这说明，当“罚款”将一种原本属于社会性的相互协作变成一种商业交易时，试图通过增加“机会成本”来阻止某一行为的发生就会失效。
令桑德尔忧心忡忡的，首先是市场的破坏性，即其所引起的堕落和腐败。他认为，市场进程大大扭曲了社会行为规范，甚至有时人们还没有意识到这一点。他解释说，金钱将改变某一种社会关系的本质。其中一个最为明显的例子就是“友谊”：人们可能会将医生、出租车司机等提供的友好、亲切的服务视为一种类似友谊的关系。然而，这种关系与“友谊”截然不同。金钱已经将此类关系的价值转换为“交易”性质。那么，长此以往，“友谊”是否最终将荡然无存？因为我们知道，友谊存在的基础，正由于它们的不可以被买卖性。于是，桑德尔告诫我们，“不要将人性（包括仁慈、博爱的感情）仅仅作为达到某种目的的手段”。
其次是市场的不道德性。桑德尔认为，即使是市场，也有其所应该遵守的道德。比如，一方拥有钱，而另一方有一颗机能正常的肾。双方都希望获得对方所拥有的东西。于是通过有“效率”的市场化交易，各取所需。虽然这种交易貌似基于双方自愿，是互利平等的，且能同时满足对方需求，但其实双方处于不公平的地位和背景：卖掉自己肾的人，并非出于真正自愿，他其实是“被迫”。这种被迫缘于自身处境的经济需要——金钱。这里所潜藏的论点，并非针对交易的自愿性，而是其公平性——为什么只有一些人不得不售卖自己的器官或者出卖自己的身体以换取金钱，而其他的人却并不需要如此？
谈及这里，当我们试图回答桑德尔所提出的问题时，就必须对事物的意义、目的以及其价值进行一番深思熟虑。
“这样的思考不可避免会涉及到对‘美好生活’所持的不同观点以及由此引发的争执。这常常是我们所惧怕涉及的。正是因为对分歧的恐惧，我们犹豫不决，迟迟不愿将所秉承的道德及精神准则公之于众”，桑德尔强调说“然而回避这些问题，只会变成市场替我们做主，商业最终将破坏大众利益”。
桑德尔指出，民主并不需要绝对的公平，但是需要人们在日常生活能享有公平。最为重要的一点是，来自不同背景和社会阶层的人们，在日常生活当中能够有接触、交流的机会，只有如此，我们才能学习如何协调并容忍相互之间的差异，并且关注“共同的善”。
归根结底，对“市场”的疑问，是对我们所希望生活在何种世界的设问。虽然桑德尔最终并未提出一个有效的方法，告知我们如何使以价格为导向的市场交易行为更为正当有效，我们眼前的世界却更加清晰：以道德为鉴，为市场划定其应有的限度。
相关链接|
寿险保单贴现 (viaticalsettle-ment)或生命安置 (lifesettle-ment)
在英美等地已有数十年历史，原意是容许一些买了寿险，但不欲继续投保，或需套现应急的人，将其保单转售予第三者，由买家继续供款至投保人身亡，领取保险金。现在，银行以折让价向垂死者大批买入寿保，而保单价钱则视乎投保人的年岁而定，年岁愈大，出售的价钱就愈高。而银行收购价，比投保人提前向保险公司套现所得更多。之后，银行会将保单捆绑包装成债券，即“死亡债券”，卖给其他投资者。当中牵涉的不同病患及预期死亡年龄，就是厘定此债劵投资级别的因素。最后，当投保人去世，投资者便会获得赔偿。换而言之，投保人愈早逝，投资者所得的回报理应愈高。相对来说，投资者要冒的风险，就是投保人比预期中长寿，最终得不偿失。
本文刊于经济观察报-书评版 2012年8月6日号
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《What Money Can't Buy》读后感(五)：钱不该买什么
美国哈佛大学教授迈克尔·桑德尔去年夏天来了一趟中国。这个一直期待体验胡同的老美逛了北京，去了杭州和上海，还在大学跟年轻人聊了天。不过这趟旅行里他记得最清楚的，却是医院里贩卖门诊号的黄牛党。
“夜晚时分，票贩子们自由自在地聚集在北京协和医院门诊大厅的一楼。价值14元人民币的门诊号被加价几百块，相当于一个中国农民一整个月的收入。在站着保安的楼道里，吆喝着兜售专家号的男人打破了医院的安静，‘唐大夫，唐大夫，谁要唐大夫的号？风湿科的唐大夫’！”
几乎每天都在中国医院上演的这一幕，被这位偶然到访的细心教授记了下来。桑德尔是哈佛大学最受欢迎的教授之一，他所授的“公正课”现场录像在网络上有过亿次的点击。如今，这个讲“公正”的教授开始转而研究“金钱”——越来越多的东西被明码标价，那么，钱到底可以买什么？
翻开报纸看报道，“美国加州只需82美元可以在坐牢时选择安静的牢房”；打开电视看新闻，“50万美元的投资可以换一张美国绿卡”；就连出门堵车时都能得到“温馨提醒”，“进入快速车道，只要8美元”。他的朋友教育孩子，只要在接受帮助后写一张“谢谢你”的纸条，就可以获得1美元“奖金”。
“我们生活的时代，似乎一切都可以拿来买卖。这种买卖逻辑不仅应用于商品上，而且正逐渐掌控着我们的生活。”桑德尔在他的新书里写道，“该是时候扪心自问，我们是否想要这样的生活？”
在这本书的白色封面上，一捆用红色牛皮筋捆起来的美元钞票站立在副标题“市场的伦理底线”旁边，而中央则用大号字写着让这位教授困扰已久的难题——《钱不应该买什么》。
------------ 有钱就可以不排队吗？----------
“在这个世界上，很多东西是钱买不到的，只是时至今日，这样的东西没多少了。”桑德尔开门见山这样写道。
这位哲学教授发现，现在想要发掘“钱买不到什么”的答案，越来越难了。过去15年里，他一直在潜心收集资料，跟钱有关的新闻塞满了一个厚厚的文件夹，里面五花八门地写着，在当今时代，钱可以买到什么。
答案丰富得惊人：只要你肯出钱，你可以在南非射杀濒临灭绝的黑犀牛，也可以请别人做代孕妈妈，还可以让孩子进入世界顶尖大学，即使不上课也能换取一个“荣誉学位”证书；企业可以购买碳排放的指标，换取污染环境的权利，国家可以掏钱雇佣私有军队，替自己的公民去战场上冲锋陷阵……
在桑德尔读高中时，这一切都还是不可想象的事情。那时候，他的同学如果因为获得好成绩而得到家长的金钱奖励，还会成为大家私底下议论纷纷的负面话题。而现在，美国许多学校宣布，如果学生成绩提高，可以获得相应的金钱奖励。
看上去，在这个“钱的时代”，有钱似乎可以买到一切。在香港，多花一倍的价格就可以买到地铁“头等座”，那里人少宽敞，“连播放广告的声音都柔和很多”；而在机场排队等待安检，只要掏钱就能直接进入“快速通道”。在美国游乐园门口也赫然贴着告示：“只需149美元，就可以直接插队排前面，马上享受每个项目的乐趣！”
这样花钱买来的插队服务打破了排队的规则。以前排队意味着“先到先得”，而如今它信奉的却是“花多少钱，办多少事”。为了避免由此引起排队者的不满，很多游乐园还提供贴心的插队服务——他们会让插队者从后门或者旁门进入，如果不得不从队伍中间加塞儿，他们还会指派一位工作人员“保驾护航”，护送你去插队。
“如果有钱的优势只体现在他们能够购买游艇、赛车或者去好地方度假，财富不平等倒也还不会显得那么扎眼。”桑德尔评论说，“但是，当金钱可以购买的东西越来越多——政治影响力、更好的医疗措施、安全的居家环境、更好的学校，这种财富分配不均就会显得异常突出。”
这种感受，在他短暂的中国之行中特别突出。在这里，花钱可以看病插队几乎是一件天经地义的事情。有的医院直接开设了“特需窗口”，多掏200块钱，病人就可以提前见到他们的“唐大夫”、“李大夫”或者是“王大夫”。
不愿排着长队通宵达旦等待挂号的病人可以从票贩子手中买号。这些专业出售插队权的小贩在熙熙攘攘的挂号处分发自己手写的名片，信誓旦旦地许诺，可以搞到任何一个大夫的门诊号。
“想在中国看病？先富起来再说吧！”美国媒体评论这么写道。
从这些司空见惯的现象里，这位偶然到访的哲学教授看到了一个严肃的伦理命题：应不应该允许病人购买提前看病的权利，仅仅因为他们可以负担起这笔钱？社会能不能允许这样的交易，只要有钱就能达成目标？
如果有钱就能买，这意味着，在日常生活中，富人有机会比穷人买到更舒适的生活条件，而在危机状态下，例如雪崩、地震等，富人则有机会用钱买更多物资，获得更大的生存可能。
“当钱能买到一切的时候，有钱就变成最重要的大事。”桑德尔说。
就像在中国，每逢春节假期前，有钱人可以买高出票价本身几倍的黄牛票，而无力承担的人只能出现在火车站售票口，在寒风中裹着大衣熬夜排队买票。
可是，对于金钱权力的不满，似乎最多也只表现为牢骚。“曾经，游乐园是全世界最平等的地方，可惜这种日子已经一去不复返了。”桑德尔在书中引用的评论这样抱怨，“想当初，每个度假的家庭在门口都要不加区别，民主地排队。”
“在我们的时代，金钱获得全面胜利。几乎一切都可以贴上价签随意出售。”桑德尔写道，“人们只是抱怨两句，发发牢骚。但是我们需要严肃的讨论，就像是你参与讨论政治事务一样，我们应该认真公开辩论，钱不应该买到哪些东西。”
-------让有钱人大获全胜，进入一个彻底的“钱的时代”？-------
桑德尔所期待的公开辩论还没开始，他自己反倒先沦为金钱时代的一枚棋子。他在日本举办讲座的时候，由于想要听的人太多，原本免费的门票被拿到网上拍卖。最后，这位著名教授发现，台下听众很多是花了500美元的高价才进来的。
于是，这场主题为“公正——如何做才是对的”的演讲不得不这样开场：“票贩子倒卖门票，这样做是对的吗？”
先不管对不对，这样的事每天都在上演。在美国，同样的事情也发生在莎士比亚身上。纽约公共剧场原本计划举办免费露天演出，却被票贩子瞅准了目标，他们早早地排队抢免费票，再以125美元的价格转手给那些没时间排队的观众。
主办演出的剧场显然认为这是不对的。他们的发言人板着脸站出来回应：“请不要这样做，这样有悖于莎士比亚的精神。”
可是，支持的声音说，从票贩子手中买票只不过是用金钱换取了排队等待的时间，这有什么错呢？
桑德尔开始尝试跟身边每一个人讨论这件事，包括诺贝尔经济学奖得主弗里德曼，也包括在英国广播公司工作、主管财经新闻的他的学生。他甚至会在吃晚餐或者全家郊游的时候，饶有兴致地跟自己的两个儿子亚当和亚伦辩论起来。
这位哈佛哲学教授拿这个问题去询问自己的同事、哈佛大学经济学教授曼昆。曼昆是经典经济学教材的作者，《曼昆经济学》在全世界销量逾百万册，教出了北京大学经济学教授樊纲，也教出了央行货币政策委员会委员李稻葵。结果，曼昆非但没有批评插队行为，反而分析其为“自由市场的优势所在”，“这种差价行为是对资源的有效分配”，“让有意愿付钱的人享受到了相应的便利”。
即便激烈争论也总是儒雅微笑的桑德尔并没有当面提出异议，但他在自己的书中用严谨的句子争辩道：这种交易会带来一个恶果——不平等，“当钱可以买到几乎一切时，那些没钱人的日子就会变得愈发难过”，这样下去，有钱人会大获全胜，我们会进入一个“钱的时代”。
事实上，对于“不平等”的焦虑，常常如同针尖一样刺痛公众的神经。今年7月，中国的网络上，一条“深圳地铁将设VIP车厢”的未经证实的消息掀起了轩然大波。这种“票价翻倍保证有座”的安排非但没有让乘客满意，反倒惹得他们愤愤不平，“怎么，地铁也要搞三六九等？”
在访问北京的当天晚上，桑德尔到清华大学演讲时，把关于钱的伦理困境扔给了台下的中国学生。这位教授风靡全球的“公正课”有一个固定套路——在富丽堂皇的哈佛讲堂里，他会先给学生讲个故事，再抛出尖锐的伦理问题，让他们在讨论中寻求对策。
这一次，他对着挤满整整一间阶梯教室的中国面孔问道：“假如发生了雪灾，每个人都需要雪橇铲雪，商店能不能加价把雪橇卖出去？”
和热闹的哈佛讲堂不同的是，底下的学生大多选择沉默。桑德尔竭力地寻找台下有回应的目光，却屡屡失望。台下的学生只是默默地举手投票，90%的人支持加价。
一个反对加价的女生站起身，紧张而飞快地答道：“我觉得这不公平，这是在帮助富人，伤害穷人。”
“假设你是店主，现在只要加价你就可以赚更多的钱，你会怎么做？”桑德尔追问她。
女生稍稍犹豫了一下，“我会加价。”
“如果卖的不是雪橇而是饮用水，你也会加价吗？”桑德尔问。
“我会的。”女生迟疑地回答，“因为这可以平衡供求关系……”
桑德尔无奈地咧嘴笑着说：“可就在这个讲座上，你刚刚还说过你不同意加价，你认为这是不公平的。”
女生似乎被问住了，结结巴巴地说：“这不公平……但这很难说……”
一个男生站起来接着说：“我认为这不公平，但是可以接受。”
“这真太有趣了。当我在加拿大、德国和瑞士提出这个问题的时候，这些资本主义国家绝大部分的人都反对加价，他们觉得这既不公平也不可接受。”桑德尔看着台下沉默的学生，笑了起来，“现在我明白了，看样子，中国真是无可否认的‘市场经济’。”
------有些东西，用钱去买就会毁掉它，比如诺贝尔奖------
一场真正的关于钱的公开辩论，终于在今年春天成为现实。在英国圣保罗大教堂，穿着一身笔挺西装的桑德尔站到话筒前，面对近2000名观众，开始发问：“银行家生病是不是就能花钱多雇个护士？”
他身旁坐着的是英国伦敦政治经济学院经济学教授，还有英国广播公司财经编辑斯黛芬尼，以及前任主教彼特·塞尔比。辩论主持人说，真没想到会在这里讨论这样的话题，上一次她到大教堂里来，还是英国政客在这儿拉票呢。
辩论中，桑德尔试图说明，钱的确可以买到很多东西，但是在购买某些事物时，这种金钱行为会“毁掉这件东西”。
“假如你非常想获得诺贝尔奖，而又没有办法靠正统的方式获得它，你当然有可能在某个诺贝尔奖得主那里买来一个奖杯。”桑德尔解释说，“你还可以把奖杯放在客厅里让人观赏，但那跟获得诺贝尔奖是完全不同的概念。”
在他看来，像诺贝尔奖这样的事物是一种荣誉，而荣誉是无法购买的。他还调侃地假设说，如果从明年开始，组委会除了正规的奖项以外，还额外拍卖一个奖杯，谁出的价最高就给谁，那么，“那时候的诺贝尔奖将再也不会代表如今它所蕴含的意义了”。
“在给事物定价之前，我们先要搞明白，它是不是一个可以被定价的东西。给不应该被金钱衡量的事物定价，这个行为本身就是错误的，是对这个事物的亵渎，将这个本该被珍视的事物放在了不属于它的天平上。”桑德尔说。
道理尽管如此，在这个“钱的时代”，有钱依然能够买到那些意想不到的东西，比方说友谊。桑德尔说，你可以“雇一个朋友”，他可以做所有“朋友会做的事情”，帮你照看孩子，在你悲伤哀嚎时，还能坐在你身边给你精神安慰。
他甚至在新闻里看到，在中国还有“帮人道歉”的网站，花钱找人替你说“对不起”。可这让他马上产生疑问，“如果我买了两个道歉，一个昂贵一个便宜，那是不是意味着，昂贵的道歉所代表的那段友谊更有意义？”
他解释说，不管是诺贝尔奖还是好朋友，它们的道理如同讨论是否应该买卖儿童、自由贩卖人体器官一样，我们不应该拿金钱来衡量。即便购买儿童的人并没有虐待他们，我们仍不应当开始这场交易，因为这样“破坏了事物本身的美好意义”，是不义之举。
桑德尔拿出了自己最常说的一句口头禅——“这不是我们应该做的事情”。
“在我们想要开始这场公开辩论、讨论市场在我们的社会中的位置之前，我们首先应该搞清楚，市场的边界在哪里，哪些东西应该被金钱衡量，而哪些东西不应该。只有搞清楚这一点，我们才有可能开始这场讨论。”他说。
----------金钱侵占了我们的生活，甚至我们的大脑-----------
让这位哲学教授担忧的是，在严肃的讨论开始之前，人们已经将金钱视为所有事物的天平。它不仅主导了世界上大部分的交易，甚至还主导了人们的思维。
这种“钱的思维”会颠倒传统意义上的对错。比如，有钱人就会模糊惩罚和费用的区别。桑德尔听说，按照中国的生育政策，超生一个孩子要缴纳20万元左右的罚款，“这对于普通工人来说是个吓人的数目，但对于有钱的商人或者明星却是小菜一碟”。
于是，这个美国教授在新闻里读到，广州的一对夫妇“大摇大摆”地闯进当地计生办公室，挺着大肚子的孕妇像是在商店买东西一样，把一大叠人民币扔在桌子上，振振有词地说：“这是20万，我们还要照顾宝宝呢，你们以后别来烦我。”
这让桑德尔意识到，当钱可以购买一切，越来越多的人会像商人那样思考，用收支平衡来考虑事情，不管在何种处境，他们的问题只有一个：“多少钱？”
就连参与辩论的女嘉宾斯黛芬尼也承认，面对自己家的孩子，她有时候也不由自主地用上这种“钱的思维”：“跟孩子讲大道理没什么用，所以我有时候会用巧克力去换他乖乖听话。这种用物质交换来的教育，到底是对是错呢？”
事实上，“钱的思维”不仅早已攻占许多思维高地，甚至登上了爱情的领地。诺贝尔经济学奖得主、美国芝加哥大学教授加里·贝克尔在上个世纪就曾提出从经济学角度出发的“婚姻公式”。
这个公式是这样的：“当结婚所带来的收益大于保持单身或者继续寻找更合适的伴侣时，这个人就会选择结婚。同理可得，当恢复单身或者嫁给另外一个人所带来的收益大于从这段婚姻中结束所带来的损失时，这个人就会终结当前的婚姻，选择离婚，而离婚的损失包括跟孩子分开、分割共有财产、相关的诉讼费用等。鉴于当下许多人都在寻找伴侣，这个婚姻‘市场’显然存在着。”
在这位冷静的经济学家看来，凡事都可以用经济学来解释，嚷嚷着这样不浪漫的人都是“被多愁善感混淆了清晰的思路”，“全心全意关注收入和价格因素，才是社会科学最坚实的根基”。
但这种“钱的思维”同样有副作用。以色列曾有一项实验，为了避免接学生的家长总是迟到，学校设立了惩罚机制，迟到的家长需要支付罚款。在此之前，他们会主动付一笔类似于小费的钱给学校，罚款金额就与这笔钱相当。
结果，引入金钱杠杆后，迟到的家长反而变多了。事实上，这项措施在实施了大约两周后，迟到家长的数量翻了一番。
“在此之前，家长掏钱是出于愧疚，他们觉得违背了准时出现的义务，给学校带来了麻烦。而当它变成罚款以后，这种愧疚感就随之消失了，这完全变成金钱交易行为，他们的迟到也就变得理直气壮。”桑德尔这么分析道。
更有趣的是，当学校取消罚款制度后，家长迟到的情况仍不见好转，“这说明一旦金钱交易侵蚀了道德义务，原有的责任感就难以恢复”。
“虽然市场可能有很多问题，但无可否认，这是目前维持社会运行不最差的选择。”斯黛芬尼辩解说。
但桑德尔忧心的问题是，这种“不最差”的思维方式却日渐涌入越来越多的伦理禁区。在哈佛大学的课堂上，他对台下的年轻人提问：“企业用20万美元的赔偿金来衡量一个人的生命，这是对的吗？”
大部分人举手表示不赞同。角落里，名叫沃泰克的学生大声地补充说：“因为还没考虑通货膨胀呢！”
桑德尔似乎被这样单纯的经济学思维懵到了。他停顿了一下，依然笑着问道：“好吧好吧，那加上通货膨胀呢？这件事情发生在35年前，考虑通货膨胀率，这个人的生命值多少钱？”
“200万美元吧，200万美元还行。”脖子上挂着白色耳机的沃泰克说，“我也不太确定这个数字啦，但给生命贴个价格，这件事绝对可行。”
没过多久，另一个叫做劳尔的学生也站起身说：“我觉得为了大部分人的经济利益，总得有人作出牺牲。”
“你可真是一个彻头彻尾的功利主义者。”桑德尔盯着他的眼睛说。
“好吧，就算是吧。”劳尔耸耸肩，“总要有人作个决定，难道不是么？”
--------我们的社会从拿市场经济做工具，变成被市场价值所操控-------
桑德尔今年59岁。面对自己所经历的“钱的时代”，他有很多问题想不明白：在过去一个世纪里发生了两次严重金融危机，为什么如此惨痛的遭遇都没有让人认真反思，市场本身究竟有什么问题？
尤其是最近的一次，2008年席卷全球的金融危机几乎击垮了华尔街。当公司纷纷宣布破产，每天都能看到穿着白色衬衫的年轻人抱着一大纸盒东西从摩天大厦里走出来，他们失业了，金融危机甚至让他们倾家荡产。
曾领导美国联邦储备委员会长达18年的艾伦·格林斯潘不得不公开表示，他对自由市场的信心陷入“震惊的怀疑之中”。英国《经济学人》杂志在封面上画了一本陷入泥潭的经济学课本，标题写着“经济哪儿出错了”？
可是，桑德尔发现，即便是面对这样切身的损失，大多数人也只是对着电视抱怨两句。当来自世界各地的专家在电视节目中说，“正是金融机构不良操作和人性贪婪，造成了如今的恶果”，他们就跟着嚷嚷两句，批评金融机构贪婪，批评政府监管不力。
“然而，在过去30年里最致命的改变并不仅仅是贪婪的蔓延，而是市场以及市场价值的扩张，市场思维侵入了许多它们本不该存在的领域。”桑德尔争辩道。
在他看来，金融危机并没有激发人们对于市场的彻底反思，反倒是引起对政府的大规模不满。2011年9月，示威者带着帐篷，举着大字标语，脸上涂着颜料或是戴着面具，聚集在纽约曼哈顿，在曾经金融精英来往的路上喊着抗议口号，试图“占领华尔街”。
“只有抗议的声音，关于市场的公开讨论却迟迟没有到来。”在圣保罗大教堂，桑德尔一字一顿地说道，“我们的公共舆论体系空洞、浅薄，正是因为我们生活在一个道德真空、缺乏有效公共讨论的时代里，才让金钱钻了空子，占了上风。”
说这话的时候，坐在桑德尔身边的主持人盯着他，抬手几次想要打断他。按这位性格温和的教授平日里的习惯，他会停下来，谦让地请女主持人讲话，但这一次他却坚持继续争辩。
“我们的社会从拿市场经济做工具，变成被市场价值所操控。市场填补了公共舆论的真空，它提供了一种看似有意义的方式来界定事物的价值，而事实上，它往往会加重这种公共舆论的空洞性。”他就像是严厉的老师在斥责学生一样，严肃地说，“我们需要每一个人不止是抱怨两句，叹息自己运气不好，而应该认真反思，严肃地辩论。”
-------- “他说的跟我没啥关系，我学经济，他讲社会公正什么的”------
在圣保罗大教堂的辩论即将结束的时候，现任英国独立监督委员会主席的彼特·塞尔比站起身说：“桑德尔是一位非常优秀的教授，但是我对他的新书有一点担忧，它让你有种错觉，仿佛厘清思想就能够改变行为，但事实上，往往是行为影响着思想。我很怕今天的讨论让大家心安理得地认为问题已经解决，却没有实际行动。”
这种担忧恐怕已经成真了。虽然被桑德尔极富感染力的演讲折服，一位在英国主修经济学的中国学生在回国后回忆起当天参与讨论的情形，却如同重述看过的电影一样，仿佛在讲另一个世界的故事：“哦，那个教授挺能说的，但他说的跟我没啥关系，我学经济，他讲社会公正什么的。”
作为桑德尔的学生，斯黛芬尼也有类似的担忧。“我们总是要在碰上新一轮的经济危机时，才会想起来市场并不可靠，可一旦风波过去，我们像是把这些事情忘得一干二净。”
“你当然可以说，市场将会帮助我们解决这些问题。”胸前挂着十字架的彼特扶了扶眼镜，“但是首先你要意识到，正是市场本身产生了这些问题。”
不过，桑德尔本人却充满信心地认为：“只要构建起坚实的公共讨论机制，我们不仅可以决定市场在社会中的定位，还能在以后更多的社会事务上加强公共辩论。”
尽管总在努力说服人们严肃反思这个“钱的时代”，但是“有钱就能买”这件事，还是在桑德尔身边继续着。朋友家的孩子也曾给他寄来过一张写着“谢谢你”的纸条，当然，这是那个朋友花了1美元“买”来的礼貌教育成果。
“不过我光看笔迹就知道，这个‘谢谢你’写得很不情愿，像是受着某样东西的胁迫。”桑德尔说。
原文刊于2012年10月24日冰点周刊
地址：http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2012-10/24/nw.D110000zgqnb_20121024_1-12.htm
《What Money Can't Buy》读后感(六)：【转】Review of Michael J. Sandel's What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limit of Markets
转一篇值得一看的外文评论，没工夫等翻译的先看英文吧。
原文在此：http://www.deirdremccloskey.com/editorials/sandel.php
Michael Sandel of Harvard teaches Government and, especially, justice, for which he is internationally known. His book is sweetly written, and offers a good occasion to examine the moral convictions of communitarians, and their distaste for the market.
One cannot but agree with Sandel that the study of markets should be remoralized. We should know why we believe, morally speaking, that bread should be allocated by a market but children should not. It’s not enough to simply sneer, from left or right or middle. Even economists need to do the philosophical work. "Markets are not mere mechanisms," Sandel wisely observes. "They embody certain norms" (p. 64). "Market reasoning is incomplete without moral reasoning" (p. 81). He is correct to stand thus against the naïve wertfrei line which Samuelsonian economists value so much.
ut the book does not do the work. Sandel is sophisticated about moral and political theory, yet his book is puzzlingly shallow. He does not provide, as he promises early on, moral reasoning, "a philosophical framework for thinking through" the "role and reach of markets" (p. 11). Instead he provides a tendentious assault, often veiled as mere reporting of what "some people" say (p. 20 and throughout), on what he claims is an unprecedented drive to price everything, "market triumphalism" (p. 14). He does battle with the more easily defeated utilitarian economists (Judge Richard Posner, for example), but ignores the best that has been thought and written on the merits of a commercial and innovative society (by John Tomasi in a recent book among many others). That is, Sandel doesn’t raise the philosophical game of the people he is lecturing. Instead he plays to their least examined political dispositions—their disposition to mere fairness unanalyzed and their disposition to mere disgust unhistoricized.
He does, to his credit, give many interesting examples of the moral dilemma in choosing money over status or queuing to allocate things, from selling kidneys to buying baseball players. Yet surprisingly for someone who has taught over the years 15,000 students in his famous course, Moral Reasoning 22, Sandel’s moral ideas in the book have no discernible connection to human moral thinking since Moses and Confucius and Socrates. The kids deserve better.
His moral thoughts in fact are two only, and thin versions even of these: that equality is good; and that the sacred can be corrupted by the profane. "The fairness objection [to what money should buy] asks about the inequality that market choices may reflect; the corruption objection asks about the attitude and norms that market relations may damage" (p. 110). That, philosophically speaking, is it.
About the first, fairness objection, Sandel repeatedly declares without a lot of further argument that "part of what’s troubling about" whatever scheme to market something he doesn’t want marketed "is the unfairness of such a system under conditions of inequality" (p. 71 and throughout). Such a "first objection" he says (or in this particular case the Sacramento Bee newspaper says), is "about fairness" (p. 36).
andel’s analysis of equality as a moral principle does not get much beyond the school-yard taunt that such-and-such is "not fair." He uses for example the truncated logic that "scalping [of, say, tickets to Shakespeare in the Park or to campsites at Yosemite] is unfair to people of modest means, who can’t afford to pay $150" (p. 36, italics supplied). The magic word here, uneconomic and unphilosophical, is "afford." Sandel tells a charming story of his old college teacher of economics praising his writings but then urging him not to reveal his [the teacher’s] name to other economists. Perhaps the teacher was embarrassed by the uneconomic usage "afford."
quot;Afford" suggests literally that the person of modest means cannot pay for an item. I cannot "afford" to buy Oprah Winfrey’s luxury house in Chicago, now up for sale at $2.8 million, even though it’s a bargain compared with its earlier asking price of $6 million. That is to say, if I cashed in all my assets, and got the largest mortgage that I could persuade a bank to give me, and robbed a few convenience stores on the side, the $2.8 million would be literally unaffordable, beyond my means. It is, as the economists put it, outside my budget line.
ut even a person of very modest means—say at the poverty line for his family of four, $23,050 annual income—can afford an expenditure of $150. The sum is far, far inside his budget line. After all, he affords an occasional harmless indulgence of a quart of ice cream for the kids or a movie for him and his wife, which add up in a year to a good deal more than $150.
What Sandel probably means, though he never says it, is that at such a poverty line the man of modest means would be pinched, whereas Oprah would scarcely notice the $150 (or for that matter the $2.8 million). To be sure. But there is no easy argument here, no three-second philosophical meal to be whipped up by merely mentioning the word. The man of modest means can afford to buy his daily bread, or even afford scalped tickets to Shakespeare (modest as may be his taste for the Bard: a point Sandel also slides by). To use the poverty of the man of modest means as a philosophical tool against markets you have to have a deeper argument than unanalyzed afford.
It’s not entirely unanalyzed—though Sandel’s analysis would perhaps further embarrass his teacher of economics. Sandel makes a supporting argument much heard on the left that "market choices are not free choices if some people are desperately poor or lack the ability to bargain on fair terms" (p. 112). "The law, in its majestic equality," noted Anatole France, "forbids the rich and the poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." Yet an economist could tell Sandel, and France, that "bargaining on fair terms" has little to do with how incomes arise, that is, how people get into or out of poverty. True, many well-intentioned and bien-pensant folk believe it does. Because they do, most of them accept for example that going down and joining the union made workers better off, by giving them better bargaining power against the bosses, even though the historical evidence is crushing that unionization did not make workers better off (rising productivity did).
Having desperately poor people is a moral problem in itself, regardless of the alleged lack of "bargaining power." The moral problem has been partly solved in many countries from 1800 to the present by commerce and innovation, previously blocked. If power, and not the supply of their labor relative to demand, were actually the problem the poor faced, the bosses with their superior bargaining power would drive down their wages to nil. Even $23,050 a year is not nil.
y international standards the US poverty line of $23,050 corrected for exchange rates is around the average of world income, and is deemed a comfortably middle-class income in India. Why does the fact matter？ Because Sandel does not answer why we Americans should ignore the desperation of people earning $1 a day in Chad, and attend instead to the "unfairness" of charging for Shakespeare tickets in Central Park. It is a moral failure of communitarianism that it weighs our fellow New Yorkers or Anglinos, our ommunity, so much more above other poor people in the world, ignoring the good for Chadians or Bangladeshis that a commercial and innovative society would do. Sandel does not note that the introduction of free markets in Sahil-grown cotton (as against European and American protection for "our" farmers) or the reception of the First World’s garbage (as Lawrence Summers once suggested in vulgar but sound reasoning) would ameliorate a most terrible lack of affordability. That is, Sandel does not face the actual, moral problem—which is poverty, real poverty, the depths. Instead he recommends that we fiddle with prices and create queues for Shakespeare in the Park.
The indirection—fiddling instead of solving—is morally indefensible. Fifty years ago the economists Milton Friedman on the right and James Tobin on the left suggested that we give at least the American poor a minimum income, and stop fiddling with the prices of housing and of bread and the like. It’s a good moral idea, which the French have implemented. Poverty (at least State-side) would be alleviated, and markets would be left to do their job of making the social pie as large as possible. Such a separation of a policy about income from a policy about the market is a standard analytic ploy in economics. Sandel’s teacher did not get it across to him.
In high theory the separation of welfare from allocation is called the Hicks-Kaldor Criterion, and is, to put it mildly, not above moral criticism. But to stride past the economic analysis is to ignore the actual moral problem—poverty—and its most direct solution. A New Yorker cartoon back in the 1960s showed a parked bank truck, with the guards handing money to people out of big sacks. Said one onlooker to another, "Well, at last the War on Poverty has gotten under way!" Yes. The comparable policy for the $1-a-day wretched of the earth is to allow capitalism to rip, which is what China has been doing since 1978 and India since 1991, with vastly more gain to the poor than from communitarian policies.
andel’s superficial philosophy ignores too, a slippery-slope objection to allocating goods outside the price system. If charging tolls on congested highways is "unfair to commuters of modest means" (in Sandel’s repeated formulation of his First Principle, p. 20), what is to stop us from concluding that charging for bread and housing and clothing and cable TV and Fritos is "unfair"？ Nothing. The unanalyzed dictum that it is "unfair" that I do not have a 100-foot yacht (really, I do find it troubling) would slope down to allocation by state direction for everything. North Korea. One can devise moral dicta to stop the slip down the road to serfdom. But Sandel does not tell his readers what the ccounter-dicta might be. He leaves his class to conclude that unadorned "unfairness" is a moral and political taunt suitable to discussions among grownups.
And Sandel ignores the moral issue of the source of unequal incomes, that is, what has famously been called, since Robert Nozick articulated it in 1974, the Wilt Chamberlain Example. Suppose Chamberlain gets from 4 million people who willingly pay 25 cents each to watch him perform hook shots. Wilt ends up a millionaire, able to "afford" a moderately big yacht. If the source of high incomes is legitimate—Fred Astaire’s feet, Jane Austen’s pen—why shouldn’t such people have preferred access to goods, even necessities？ Professor Sandel’s lectures here summarized give no reply. Indeed, as argued in 1971 by John Rawls (Sandel is well known in philosophical circles for attacking Rawls as insufficient communitarian), if a Carnegie or a Gates innovates in such a way that even the least among us is made better off, then the prices, including the profits that evoked their innovation should be left alone, shouldn’t they？ What’s the beef？
Or turn to the most fundamental philosophical argument (as against the schoolyard, communitarian argument from "afford") for allowing the price system to get on with the job. It was articulated first in 1962 by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock and popularized by Rawls in his book a decade later. Suppose that behind a veil of ignorance of where you or I would end up in some future system of markets and creative destruction, or their communitarian opposites, we are asked to decide what constitution we would agree to. Go ahead, choose: neo-liberal markets or communitarian interventions. Suppose, as in fact happened in Holland and then Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we pretty much agree to the Bourgeois Deal—you let me, a bourgeoise, make a fortune inventing the coffee trade or very cheap steel or a computer operating system, and in the third act of the economic drama I’ll make you (all) rich by historical and international standards: $129 a day per person in the United States in 2010 as against $6 a day in the same prices in 1800 and $1.40 a day now in Zimbabwe and less in North Korea. The Deal is not in the first act egalitarian, which is as far as Sandel’s economic and philosophical analysis reaches. Yet by the third act it has been powerfully enriching for the poor, satisfying a Buchananite-Rawlsian standard of improving the lot of the worst off. The daily incomes per person in the average country that has agreed to the Bourgeois Deal has risen, in real, inflation-corrected terms, from an appalling $3 a day in 1800 (and likewise since the caves) to $100 a day now (thus the UK)—and much higher if one properly allows for the much higher quality since 1800 of travel and medicine and economic analysis.
The poor have benefited the most from capitalism. The sheer, first-act, unanalyzed equality that Sandel advocates would have killed the modern world and kept us in the appalling poverty of the human condition down to 1800. In fact in some countries it did, such as India after 1947, under Gandhi-plus-London-School-of-Economics egalitarianism, the "License Raj" and "the Hindu rate of growth," as the Indians themselves bitterly described their communitarian economy. When I talk to friends who think like Sandel I worry that their dispositions will kill, quite unintentionally, the only chance for the world’s poor to achieve the scope for a full human life.
andel is not untutored. He knows such arguments, I imagine, and anyway they are not rocket science. Perhaps he tells them to the kids in the fifth week of his course. I hope so. But in the present book, the better to cast doubt on a neo-liberalism he detests, he has chosen not to reveal the other side, and to rely instead on a non-philosophical notion of schoolyard fairness as a First Principle. It is as though he has contempt for the common reader, and is unwilling to assume that she could adjudicate the serious arguments, pro and con, if they were presented.
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His Second Principle, and his much better argument for what money can’t buy, is that it can cause the Sacred to be spoiled by the Profane. Sandel does not actually use the theological words. He would have benefitted from studying theology, and would have gotten further in his moral philosophy. Since he has nice things to say about the religious tradition elsewhere, I suppose, if he would only work at it, he could get serious about the sacred and profane.
Meanwhile, though, his theory remains at the simpliste level of an unanalyzed contrast between the two, up/down. His only analysis is that "we corrupt a good, an activity, or a social practice whenever we treat it according to a lower norm than is appropriate to it" (p. 46). Sensible. But Sandel provides no philosophical framework for deciding what is lower, and why we are disgusted when professional ethics in banking, say, is corrupted by sheer maximization of profits.
One framework, for example, might be the virtue ethics common to the West and the East since the sixth century BCE. It would note that some goods (devotion to God, to parenthood, to philosophical analysis) are neither self-goods arising from the virtues of prudence and temperance or other-goods arising from the virtues of justice or human love. They are tertia, giving point to human lives. Perform the mental experiment, as Aquinas did in the 1350s, and as Elizabeth Anscombe did in the 1950s during the revival of virtue ethics (a feat performed mainly by female British analytic philosophers, together with a few honorary women such as Alasdair Macintyre). Imagine a life without the transcendent virtues of hope (having a project) or faith (having an identity) or spiritual love (having a reason to strive towards God or Baseball or Science). As the early Anglican theologian Richard Hooker put it in 1593, "Man doth seek a triple perfection. . . . For although the beauties, riches, honors, sciences, virtues [i.e., powers], and perfections of all men living, were in the present possession of one; yet somewhat beyond and above all this there would still be sought and earnestly thirsted for" (Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, First Book, XI, 4).
andel does, again, give many good examples of the danger from slipping the profane market into matters best left to a sacred somewhat beyond yet earnestly thirsted for. His book is mainly raw examples, scores and scores of them. We can agree in 2012 that parenthood is sacred, and therefore selling children is nowadays regarded as disgusting, and even "trafficking in the right to procreate promotes a mercenary attitude towards children that corrupts parenthood" (p. 71). Paying a child to read a book may give her the idea that reading books is "way of making money [though in truth it is], and so erode, or crowd out, or corrupt the love of reading for its own sake" (p. 61). Paying for the daily paper is one thing; paying to have a second child in China is another (though again it is notable that Sandel does not reflect on the direct solution, which would be to drop the One Child Policy itself; he believes, with many on the anti-economic left, expressed in eugenics, that the community has an interest in stopping births).
His examples suggest why the growing fashion for what the professor of economics Robert Frank calls approvingly "libertarian paternalism," the "nudging" that the professor of law Cass Sunstein has brought into the Obama administration, might be mistaken. "If cash can cure us of obesity," Sandel asks rhetorically, channeling the nudgers, "why cavil about manipulation？" "One answer," Sandel notes, "is that a proper concern for our physical well-being is part of self-respect," and that "paying people to take their meds does little to develop [the proper concerns for one’s physical well-being]. . . and may even undermine them" (p. 59). Yes.
Here he sounds indeed sweetly libertarian, since self-respect is one of the chief goods of a market society—in which it is not the community that takes all care of us. He might have reflected, as Tomasi does in his book, about the self-respect that comes from earning one’s way. Minimum-wage laws that prevent people from working might undermine self-respect, by making unskilled people into wards of the community. But Sandel, following his teaching plan of superficial philosophy combined with numerous unanalyzed and politically slanted examples, does not reflect.
andel is persuasive, admittedly, when he goes after thenaïfs of Prudence Only, especially my fellow Chicagoans such as the economist Gary Becker and the alarmingly productive federal judge Posner or the freakonomics writers Steven Leavitt and Stephen Dubner. Sandel is right that what is called "agency theory," which has taken over American graduate schools of business in the past forty years, is naïve in declaring that all we need is incentives, like trained seals. We also need professionalism and judgment and history and norms, as the bankers have recently learned. But going after the Chicagoans is like shooting fish in a philosophical barrel.
Yet Sandel offers no philosophical standard for the bankers or for his students. One can readily agree that buying grades in school or buying honorary degrees, or paying for a friend’s advice or a husband’s sexual services, are viewed nowadays by "some people" as immoral. But why exactly, professor？ Once upon a time all such things were for sale. In the European Middle Ages one could buy almost anything—wheat and iron, yes, but also husbands, marketplaces, kingdoms, eternal salvation. Sandel claims repeatedly that "market triumphalism" is a novelty. But that’s bad history, albeit the sort that most people believe: that in olden days we were pure and fair, and now we are capitalist and corrupt. The golden age of allocation by fairness and disgust was not olden days but 1933-1968. Before 1933 markets ruled, in China and India as much as in England and Italy.
andel worries properly that the market can crowd out the sacred. A corporate market in, say, instruction in elementary classrooms can crowd out unbiased teaching about capitalism. Yet Sandel does not tell his own classroom that state schools can crowd out unbiased teaching about, say, the environment.
And what about crowding in？ A society in which goods are allocated by race or gender or Party membership is not obviously superior in moral terms to one in which prices rule. Sandel declares that "we must also ask whether market norms will crowd out non-market norms" (p. 78). But he provides no philosophical analysis of how we would answer the opposite crowding, as when non-market norms of Jim Crow in the Sandelian golden age crowded out the market norm that a black person’s money is as good at a lunch counter as a white person’s. A market society is by no means contemptible ethically, if one actually looks into the ethical effects and thinks about them. The French spoke in the eighteenth century of doux commerce, the civilizing effect of markets introduced into societies of status or isolation.
What then？ This: Sandel has not treated his students and his readers morally. He has given them many, many examples tending, he thinks, to confirm their uncritically Progressive biases. But he has withheld from the students the moral philosophy that would allow them the dignity of an intellectual choice.
Over the front door of the late-medieval city hall in the Dutch city of Gouda is the motto of the first modern economy, the first large society in which commerce and innovation instead of state regulation and social status were honored. It says, Audite et alteram partem—Listen even to the other side. It’s good advice for a society of the bourgeoisie, and for a classroom for students of philosophy.